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ALLEGING DEMAND FUTILITY IN FEDERAL COURT
In a derivative suit, a shareholder or shareholders bring a claim on
behalf of a corporation against a third party, unlike a direct action in which
a shareholder brings a personal claim against a corporation.' Although a
derivative action serves as a valuable mechanism by which shareholders may
seek to redress a harm inflicted on the corporation, a shareholder cannot
1. See In re Penn Central See. Litig., 335 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(observing need to distinguish derivative action from direct action); Horwitz v. Balaban, 112
F. Supp. 99, 101-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (distinguishing personal right of action from derivative
action); see also AzmBUcAN LAW INsTrrTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECO.MMENDATIONS § 7.01, at 16-17 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1986) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Tent Draft. No. 6)] (distinguishing direct and derivative actions);
13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAwv OF PRVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5908, 5911 (1980)
(same). See generally Note, Distinguishing Between Direct and Derivative Shareholder Suits,
116 U. PA. L. REv. 1147 (1962) (distinguishing between direct and derivative actions). A
shareholder can assert a personal right against the corporation in a direct action. See Horwitz,
112 F. Supp. at 101 (recognizing that shareholder has personal right of action against
corporation to attack fraudulent transaction that deprived plaintiff of rights as shareholder);
see also W. FLETCHER, supra, at § 5909 (discussing individual shareholder's right to sue
corporation). A derivative action, however, is a suit that a shareholder brings on behalf of
the corporation to redress an injury inflicted on the corporation. See Horwitz, 112 F. Supp.
at 101 (shareholder can bring derivative suit if shareholder suffered indirect injury as result
of injury to corporation); see also W. FLETCHER, supra, at § 5908 (shareholder seeking to
assert right on behalf of corporation must bring derivative action). See generally Daily Income
Fund, Inc., v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 527-34 (1984) (discussing purpose and application of
derivative action). Federal courts occasionally have difficulty classifying a suit as a derivative
or a direct action. See W. FLETCHER, supra, at § 5911 (courts generally have little difficulty
distinguishing between direct and derivative actions, but courts may have difficulty classifying
some actions that contain elements of direct and derivative action).
A shareholder of a corporation at common lav could not hold directors or officers
accountable to a corporation in an action at law. W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CoPoRTE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS §17.01 (1978). Equitable relief, in the form of the derivative suit,
arose to provide shareholders with a means of asserting rights against the corporate management
and against third parties on behalf of a corporation. Id.; see Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,
477 (1979) (derivative suit is shareholder action to enforce claim on behalf of corporation);
Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947) (derivative
action developed in equity to redress breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate managers); Meyer
v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161, 167 (1945) (derivative action is equitable remedy designed for
situations in which corporate management fails to assert corporation's rights); McClure v.
Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 827 (3d Cir. 1961) (shareholders can use derivative action to
hold directors accountable to corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties); Pogostin v. Rice,
480 A.2d 619, 624-25 (Del. 1984) (shareholder can obtain redress for corporation harmed as
result of misuse of managerial power); see also Evangelist v. Fidelity Management & Research
Co., 554 F. Supp. 87, 91 (D. Mass. 1982) (derivative action consists of action against third
parties and of action against directors for failing to bring suit on behalf of corporation). See
generally 13 W. FLETCHER, supra, at §§ 5939-5941.1 (shareholders bring derivative suit, which
is equitable action, on behalf of corporation). Federal courts generally view the derivative
action as an extraordinary remedy. See infra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing courts
that declare derivative action to be extraordinary remedy).
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bring derivative actions indiscriminately.2 Federal courts require that a
shareholder demonstrate standing to sue and exhaustion of intracorporate
remedies before the shareholder can maintain an action on behalf of the
corporation.' To establish exhaustion of intracorporate remedies, a share-
2. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978)
(derivative suit serves as weapon to remedy corporate management abuses); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (shareholder derivative suit is potent tool to redress conduct of
unfaithful management); see also Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder
Derivative Actions, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 168, 168 (1976) [hereinafter Note, The Demand and
Standing Requirements] (discussing minority shareholders' use of derivative suit as principal
weapon to redress harm to corporation). The standing and demand requirements constitute the
primary limitations on shareholder derivative actions. See Hawes v. City of Oakland,-104 U.S.
450, 460-61 (1881) (developing requirements for shareholder derivative action); see also Note,
The Demand and Standing Requirements, supra, at 168 (standing and demand requirements are
main limitations on shareholder actions); infra note 3-8 and accompanying text (discussing re-
quirements that shareholder must meet to maintain derivative action in federal courts); infra
note 7 and accompanying text (discussing judicial recognition of derivative suit as extraordinary
remedy).
In Hawes v. City of Oakland, the United States Supreme Court announced that a
shareholder must satisfy two conditions before instituting a shareholder derivative action.
Hawes, 104 U.S. at 460-61. The Supreme Court in Hawes stated that a shareholder could
proceed with a derivative suit only if the corporation possessed a right of action. Id. at 460.
The Court stated that in certain situations a shareholder could bring an action on behalf of
a corporation to redress a harm inflicted on the corporation, particularly when the corporation
suffered the injury as a result of actions of the corporate managers or a third party. Id.
In addition, the Court insisted that a shareholder should exhaust all intracorporate remedies
before initiating a derivative action. Id. at 460-61. The two requirements that the Supreme
Court established in Hawes evolved into Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Rule 23.1). See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 530 (1984) (Hawes established
prerequisites to commencement of derivative suit); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 n.4
(1970) ( Hawes decision led to derivative suit requirements listed in Rule 23.1); see also 7C C.
WRIGHr, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PRocEDuRE §1828 (1986) (discussing
development of Rule 23.1); Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements, supra, at 746
(observing that most states derive demand requirements from Hawes).
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (embodying standing requirement in federal derivative
action); infra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that shareholder exhaust
all intracorporate remedies before resorting to derivative litigation). In order to satisfy the
standing requirement of Rule 23.1, the plaintiff must have owned shares in the corporation at
the time of the allegedly injurious transaction. Id.; see Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 237-
38 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussing Rule 23.1 standing requirement); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co.,
292 F.2d 824, 827-28 (3d Cir. 1961) (requiring plaintiff's contemporaneous ownership of
corporate shares in order for plaintiff to bring derivative suit); see also C. WRIGHir, A. MILLER
& M. KANE, supra note 2, at § 1828 (discussing Rule 23.1 requirement that plaintiff own
shares in stock of corporation at time of contested transaction); Note, The Demand and
Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 168, 191-200 (discussing nature of standing requirement
and providing examples of situations in which plaintiffs had standing to sue). The American
Law Institute recommends that a shareholder must have held an equity security prior to the
public disclosure of the alleged wrong or the shareholder's knowledge of the wrong, continued
to have held the equity security throughout the litigation, and fairly and adequately represent
the shareholders' interests. ALI PRMnCwwas OF CORomA GoVasNoANcE (Tent. Draft No. 6),
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holder must indicate to the court any efforts that the shareholder made to
obtain the desired action from the board of directors of the corporation, a
process known as making demand. 4 Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
supra note 1, at § 7.02, at 37-38.
In addition to requiring a shareholder to have held shares at the time of the contested
transaction, many federal courts, as well as the American Law Institute, also require a
shareholder to own shares of the corporation's stock at the time of the suit because Rule 23.1
allows one or more shareholders to bring suit. See, e.g., Lewis v. Chiles, 719 F.2d 1044, 1047
(9th Cir. 1983) (observing language in Rule 23.1 permitting one or more shareholders to bring
derivative action); Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 1983) (same); deHaas v.
Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir. 1971) (same); Issen v. GSC Enter.,
538 F. Supp. 745, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (same); see also W. KNEPPER, supra note 1, at §17.02
(same); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 2, at § 1826 (same). See generally
Note, The Continuous Ownership Requirement: A Bar to Meritorious Shareholder Derivative
Actions? 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1013 (1986) [hereinafter Note, The Continuous Ownership
Requirement] (discussing need for continuous ownership of stock in derivative action).
In order to satisfy the standing requirement, a shareholder also must demonstrate that he
fairly and adequately represents the interests of the shareholders in enforcing an action for
the corporation. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1 (plaintiff must represent shareholders adequately in
order to bring derivative action); see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 549 (1949) (shareholder bringing derivative action serves as representative of similarly
situated shareholders and does not sue for himself alone); Schupak v. Covelli, 498 F. Supp.
704, 706 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (plaintiff's interest in derivative action should reflect interests of
other shareholders). See generallj, W. FLETctm, supra note 1, at § 5981.1 (plaintiff adequately
must represent shareholder interests); C. WRIrr, A. MILLER & M. KAa, supra note 2, at §
1833 (same).
In addition to requiring a shareholder to satisfy the standing and demand requirements,
a state may insist that a shareholder fulfill other requirements, such as offering security for
the expenses of the suit. See W. KNEPPER, supra note 1, at § 17.07 (noting that some states
may require plaintiff to advance security for expenses); C. WRIGHr, A. MILLER & M. KANE,
supra note 2, at § 1835 (same); Note, The Standing and Demand Requirements, supra note
2, at 168 n.5 (same).
4. See Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1881) (to demonstrate
exhaustion of intracorporate remedies, shareholder must make earnest effort to induce directors
to take action); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980) (demand requirement exists
to force shareholders to exhaust intracorporate remedies); Tabas v. Mullane, 608 F. Supp.
759, 765 (D.N.J. 1985) (Rule 23.1 and Delaware corporate law both require shareholder to
exhaust intracorporate remedies before commencing derivative litigation); Reilly Mortgage
Group, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Savings & Loan Ass'n, 568 F. Supp. 1067, 1075 (E.D. Va.
1983) (demand has practical purpose of requiring shareholder to exhaust intracorporate
remedies); Evangelist v. Fidelity Management & Research Co., 554 F. Supp. 87, 90 (D. Mass.
1982) (same); see also ALI Panici'LEs oF CoaRoRAT GovERN~AcE (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra
note 1, at § 7.03(a), at 57-58 (shareholder should make written demand on directors and
provide directors with reasonable notice of essential facts); C. WRoIr, A. MILLER & M.
KANE, supra note 2, at § 1831 (federal court should permit derivative action only if corporation
will not act on its own to redress injury); Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements,
supra note 2, at 169 (shareholder must make demand on directors and shareholders to prove
exhaustion of intracorporate remedies); infra note 5 (partial text of Rule 23.1 as example of
typical demand requirement). Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a
plaintiff to allege with particularity any efforts made to obtain the desired action from the
directors, and possibly from other shareholders, or to allege his reasons for failing or refusing
to make the effort. FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1. The shareholder's demand request to the court
1987]
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Procedure (Rule 23.1) embodies the standing and demand requirements for
a derivative action.5 The demand requirement codified in Rule 23.1 essen-
tially contains a general rule and an exception. 6 Because the derivative suit
is an extraordinary remedy, the general rule requires that a shareholder
demand that the board of directors, or comparable authority, bring an
action on behalf of the corporation before commencing a derivative action.
7
should identify the wrongdoers, describe the factual basis of the allegedly wrongful acts, and
request remedial relief. Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1117 (D. Del.
1985) aff'd, 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in
pertinent part:
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff
to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if
necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain
the action or for not making the effort.
Id. Most states have statutes or rules similar to Rule 23.1. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 800(b) (West 1977) (state procedural rule embodying demand requirement); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13-A, § 627(1)(B) (1964) (same); MICH. Compn. LAws ANN. § 450.1492(b) (1973)
(same); VA. CODE ANm. § 13.1-672(B) (1985) (same); see also Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d
51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980) (Rule 23.1 reflects prevailing state law requirements); Buxbaum, Conflict-
of-Interest Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Directors in Derivative Actions, 68 CALIF.
L. REv. 1122, 1123 (1980) (most jurisdictions have created substantive requirements that
shareholders make demand or state reasons for falling to make demand); Note, The Demand
and Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 169 (many states have statutes or rules similar
to Rule 23.1).
6. FED. R.Crv. P. 23.1; see supra note 5 (partial text of Rule 23.1 of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
7. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1983) (recognizing derivative suit
as extraordinary remedy); In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir.
1973) (recognizing Rule 23.1 as exceptional rule of pleading) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973);
Brody v. Chem. Bank, 66 F.R.D. 87, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Rule 23.1 demand requirement
indicates that derivative suit is extraordinary remedy) aff'd, 517 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1975); see
also W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, at § 5941.1 (courts recognize derivative suit as extraordinary
remedy); Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit,
73 HAv. L. REv. 746, 748-49 (1959) [hereinafter Note, Demand on Directors] (same).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Brody v.
Chemical Bank recognized that a court should permit a derivative action only when a board
of directors wrongfully has declined to pursue a shareholder's claim. Brody, 66 F.R.D. at 89.
The Brody court reasoned that the board is the real party in interest and retains primary
responsibility for taking action in the name of the corporation. Id.; see infra notes 24 and
accompanying text (board of directors determines whether to assume control of shareholder's
suit).
By requiring shareholders to demand that the board consider assuming the shareholders
claim on behalf of the corporation, the demand requirement prevents shareholders from
resorting to derivative actions whenever the shareholders feel that a third party has harmed
the company. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 23.1 (Rule 23.1 requires shareholder to make demand on
board); see also Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 518 F.2d
873, 877 (7th Cir. 1975) (counsel for plaintiff/shareholder should make demand on directors
before instituting almost any derivative action); Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements,
supra note 2, at 173 (shareholders should make demand on board prior to commencing almost
every derivative action).
ALLEGING DEMAND FUTILITY
Recognizing that in some instances a shareholder reasonably cannot expect
a board to evaluate fairly the shareholder's claim, Congress provided an
exception to the demand requirement in Rule 23.1 that permits a shareholder
to explain the reason that the shareholder failed to request the board to
pursue his claim if the shareholder refused to consult the board.' If a
federal court agrees with the shareholder that the directors unjustly rejected
the plaintiff's claim, or if the court concedes that making demand would
be futile, the court will excuse demand and allow the shareholder to bring
a derivative action.9
Although federal courts agree on the importance of requiring a share-
holder to demonstrate efforts made to obtain action from the directors or,
in the alternative, to state reasons for failing to make demand, the courts
disagree on the criteria necessary to assert an allegation of demand or
demand futility.' 0 In interpreting Rule 23.1, therefore, federal courts have
enforced the demand requirement with varying degrees of vigor." Some
jurisdictions stringently enforce the demand rule, rarely excusing a share-
holder's failure to make demand on the board of directors. 12 Other juris-
8. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1984) (court
does not require demand if effort to persuade directors to assume control of suit would
constitute idle gesture); Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983) (shareholders need
not make demand on directors if making demand would be futile); Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton
Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 53 (5th Cir. 1980) (same) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981);
Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 518 F.2d 873, 877 (7th
Cir. 1975) (same); see also ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Tent. Draft No. 6),
supra note 1, at § 7.03(b), at 58 (court should excuse demand if plaintiff makes specific
showing that majority of board is either interested in injurious transaction, or aided and
abetted wrongful self-dealing or illegal acts, or if corporation otherwise would suffer irreparable
injury); Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 173 (court should
excuse demand only if requiring exhaustion of intracorporate remedies would be futile).
9. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (asserting that courts should require
shareholders to make demand on directors unless effort would be futile).
10. See infra notes 63-119 and accompanying text (discussing federal courts' varying
interpretations of demand requirement in determining sufficiency of shareholder's allegation
of demand futility). The United States Supreme Court never has stated the facts a share-
holder must plead to determine sufficiency of demand, and federal courts do not recognize a
generally uniform or a precise standard. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 2, at
§ 1831.
11. See infra notes 63-119 and accompanying text (discussing federal precedent that
exemplifies different standards for determining sufficiency of allegation of demand futility).
12. See Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419, 423-24
(E.D. Mich. 1986) (adopting strict standard of demand futility). In Consumers Power, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan analyzed the various standards
that federal courts apply in determining the sufficiency of an allegation of demand futility.
Id. The Consumers Power. court asserted that federal courts generally apply a stricter standard
than state courts, requiring the plaintiff to allege and establish a breach of the duty of loyalty
with particularity. Id. at 423; see Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983) (refusing
to excuse shareholder demand absent an allegation of director self-dealing or other bias);
Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204, 1209-11 (9th Cir. 1980) (requiring plaintiff
to allege more than conclusory allegations of directorial control of board or mere directorial
approval of, or participation in, wrongful transaction to excuse demand); Heit v. Baird, 567
1987]
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dictions, however, adopt a more liberal interpretation of the demand
requirement, excusing demand with greater frequency and permitting a larger
number of derivative actions. 3 The inconsistent interpretations of Rule 23.1
have created confusion among federal courts attempting to define a standard
of demand futility that best satisfies and serves the purpose of the demand
requirement.
14
Federal courts developed the demand requirement as a device for
controlling unnecessary derivative suits. 5 The courts not only respect direc-
F.2d 1157, 1169-62 (1st Cir. 1977) (refusing to excuse shareholder demand because plaintiffs
failed to show that majority of board engaged in facially improper transaction, and following
strict standard of demand futility developed in In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479
F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1973)); In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 264-67 (Ist
Cir. 1973) (plaintiff must allege with particularity that self-interested directors dominated and
controlled disinterested majority, and court will refuse to excuse demand absent allegation that
directors approved of injurious transaction for personal gain) cert denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973);
In re Penn Central Sec. Litig., 367 F. Supp. 1158, 1164-65 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (demand excused
because parent corporation dominated board of subsidiary corporation); see also D. BLOCK,
N. BARTON & S. RADrN, THE BusiNrss JoDoim:tEr RuLE 236-39 (1987) (asserting that plaintiff
alleging demand futility in First or Ninth Circuits must demonstrate to court that majority of
directors were involved in transaction which was unrelated to corporate purpose); infra notes
91-120 and accompanying text (discussing application of strict standard of interpretation of
demand futility to particular cases).
13. See Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 53 (5th Cir. 1980) (court
will presume demand futility if plaintiff names controlling shareholders as defendants) cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Liboff v. Wilson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971) (demand
excused because plaintiff alleged that majority of directors participated in, approved of, or
acquiesced in wrongful transaction); Meyers v. Keeler, 414 F. Supp. 935, 936-38 (W.D.Okla.
1976) (plaintiff failed to allege with sufficient particularity reasons for requesting court to
excuse demand); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 813-15 (D. Colo. 1968),
aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1970) (court excused demand because two hostile, inside
directors controlled three disinterested, outside directors); see also Note, The Demand and
Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 170 (noting that Fifth and Tenth Circuits generally
construe demand liberally); infra notes 63-90 and accompanying text (discussing decisions of
federal courts that adopt liberal approach to interpretation of demand requirement).
14. See infra notes 63-119 and accompanying text (discussing differing approaches of
federal courts in determining sufficiency of alleged futility of demand). In addition to deciding
the appropriate legal standard to use in determining whether a shareholder has complied with
the demand requirement of Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts
also must decide whether to apply federal or state law in interpreting Rule 23.1. See Burks v.
Lasker, 441 U.S. 473, 475 & 486 (1979) (recognizing debate over whether court should apply
state or federal law in determining power of directors to terminate shareholder suit, and ruling
in favor of state law to extent that law is consistent with federal acts); In re BankAmerica
Sec. Litig., 636 F. Supp. 419, 421 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (recognizing that courts express differing
views concerning applicable law, and concluding that state law should govern in determining
sufficiency of shareholder's compliance with demand requirement). See generally D. BLOCK,
N. BARTON & S. RADiN, supra note 12, at 225-27 (discussing choice of law issues that federal
court must address when considering demand futility); Note, The Continuous Ownership
Requirement, supra note 3, at 1015-18 (discussing conflict over whether to apply state or
federal law in evaluating sufficiency of shareholder's compliance with Rule 23.1).
15. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978)
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tors' decisions concerning a corporation's affairs, but also prefer to avoid
intervening in the internal operations of private companies. 16 Underlying
the demand requirement is the presumption that directors are fiduciaries of
the corporation who will act in the best interests of the corporation. 7
Directors owe to the corporation and to the corporate shareholders two
fiduciary duties." First, the corporation and its shareholders expect the
corporate managers to exercise a duty of loyalty. 9 The duty of loyalty
prevents a director from using the management position to attain personal
profit, and thus prohibits self-dealing and usurpation of corporate oppor-
tunities.20 Directors also owe to the corporation a duty of care, which
(allowing board to consider whether shareholder's claim is worth pursuing might prevent
meritless causes of action); see also ALI PRINCIPLES OF CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE (Tent. Draft
No. 6), supra note 1, at § 7.03 comment, at 59 (demand rule protects court from hearing case
that is not ripe or that board could remedy without resorting to litigation).
16. See, e.g., Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419, 424
(E.D. Mich. 1986) (requiring shareholder to seek desired action from corporation before
resorting to litigation prevents courts from interfering in internal affairs of private corporations
unless unavoidable); Reilly Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Savings & Loan Ass'n,
568 F. Supp. 1067, 1075 (E.D. Va. 1983) (one function of demand requirement is to prevent
courts from intervening in corporate affairs); Brooks v. American Export Indus., 68 F.R.D.
506, 510 (C.D.N.Y. 1975) (federal courts should not interfere in matters of private corporations
unless directors wrongfully refuse to take action on behalf of corporation); see also Note, The
Demand and Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 171 (demand requirement originated to
prevent courts from interfering with internal affairs of private corporations).
17. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing directors' fiduciary obli-
gations of loyalty and care).
18. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing
directors' fiduciary duties to corporation); Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir.
1983) (corporation imposes fiduciary duties on directors and officers because of their positions
as managers of corporation); Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 375 (2d Cir. 1980)
(majority of states recognize that directors owe various fiduciary duties to corporation); Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (directors owe unyielding fiduciary duty to
corporation and shareholders); see also infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing
particular duties that directors and officers owe to corporation and shareholders). Federal
courts impose fiduciary duties on corporations to prevent directors from using management
positions as a means of gaining personal profit or other advantage. Note, Standards of Conduct
Applicable to the Individual Corporate Director, 33 Bus. LAw. 1599, 1599 (1978) [hereinafter
Note, Standards of Conduct].
19. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (board
member owes corporation and shareholders duty of loyalty); Weiss Medical Complex, Ltd.,
v. Kim, 87 Il1. App. 3d 111, 115, 408 N.E.2d 959, 963 (Il. 1980) (court imposes duty of
loyalty on directors); see also Note, Standards of Conduct, supra note 18, at 1599 (director
owes corporation and shareholders duty of loyalty); infra note 20 and accompanying text
(discussing specific duties of loyalty that director owes to corporation).
20. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (duty of
loyalty derives from prohibition against self-dealing); see also AmIUCAN LAw INSTnsUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 5.08-5.13, at 107-229 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984)
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Tent. Draft No. 3)] (describing and
illustrating aspects of directorial duty of loyalty to corporation); W. KNEPPER, supra note 1,
at § 1.05 (duty of loyalty contemplates that directors will refrain from engaging in personal
activities that might injure or disadvantage corporation); Note, Standards of Conduct, supra
note 18, at 1599-6000 (duty of loyalty develops from concepts of conflict of interest, duty of
fairness, corporate opportunity, and confidentiality).
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requires the corporate managers to use the care in fulfilling management
functions that a reasonably prudent person would use in similar circum-
stances.21 In evaluating the duty of care, courts employ the business judgment
rule.22 The business judgment rule bars judicial inquiry into the actions of
directors taken in good faith and in the honest pursuit of a legitimate
business purpose.23 In their capacities as managers of the company, the
directors must consider the claims of a shareholder and determine, in the
directors' business judgment, whether to attempt to remedy the alleged
wrong internally or whether to pursue a shareholder's claim on behalf of
the corporation. 24 By requiring that a shareholder make demand on the
board to bring an action on behalf of the corporation, the courts force a
21. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986) (director has obligation to discharge directorial responsibilities with same due diligence ordi-
narily prudent person would use in similar circumstances); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,
744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (in exercising corporate functions, director has duty to use
care that reasonably prudent person would use in similar circumstances); see also REVisED
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984) (director must act in good faith, with care that
ordinarily prudent person would use in similar position under similar circumstances, and in
manner director reasonably believes to be in best interests of corporation); ALI PRuICIPLEs OF
CORPORATE GovRNANC, (Tent. Draft No. 3), supra note 20, § 4.01, at 5-6 (describing duty
of care required of directors and officers in exercising functions as managers of corporation).
22. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986) (New York courts employ business judgment rule to evaluate duty of care); Norlin Corp.
v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (same).
23. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986) (citing Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 926 (1979), for proposition that business judgment rule bars judicial inquiry into actions
of corporate directors taken in good faith in exercise of honest judgment in lawful pursuit of
business purpose); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984)
(same); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1980) (business judgment doctrine
prohibits judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in good faith in honest
pursuit of legitimate corporate purposes); see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979) (business judgment doctrine is based on
rationale that courts are ill-equipped to judge business decisions, and seldom are required to
evaluate business decisions).
24. See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 784 (3d Cir. 1982) (demand requirement is based
on premise that corporation's decision to enforce right on its own behalf is matter of business
judgment within domain of directors) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Galef v. Alexander,
615 F.2d 51, 57 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980) (board of directors decides whether to pursue shareholder's
claim in exercise of business judgment); Evangelist v. Fidelity Management & Research Co.,
554 F. Supp. 87, 91 (D. Mass. 1982) (board should use business judgment to decide whether
to take control of shareholder's action); see also Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements,
supra note 2, at 171 (directors decide whether to proceed with shareholder's claim).
The Delaware Supreme Court has declared explicitly that the issue of demand futility is
bound to the duty of care. See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (issues of
business judgment and standards by which director action are measured are inextricably bound
to issue of demand futility); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808, 809 & 812 (Del. 1984)
(relating demand futility to protections of business judgment rule); see also D. BLOCK, N.
BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 12, at 228-36 (discussing Delaware courts' approach to demand
futility issue).
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shareholder to allow the directors to act as managers of the corporation
and simultaneously prevent courts from interfering unnecessarily in corpo-
rate affairs. 2 In requiring a shareholder to present to the corporate managers
the first opportunity to control a claim brought on behalf of the corporation,
a court assumes that the directors objectively can distinguish between a
frivolous and a meritorious claim.
26
Contrary to the judicial presumption that directors objectively can decide
whether to bring a shareholder's claim, evidence exists indicating that
directors cannot decide in a disinterested manner whether to pursue a
shareholder's claim.27 An argument forwarded in support of inescapable
directorial self-interest is the structural bias theory. 2 Structural bias reflects
the inherent prejudice of a board of directors in considering the merits of
a shareholder's claim due to the board members' loyalty to each other as
members of an elite group. 29 Moreover, senior management typically selects
25. See supra notes 4 & 16 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of demand
requirement).
26. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting that courts rely on premise that
directors capably can exercise sound business judgment in deciding whether to assume share-
holder's claim). But see infra notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text (suggesting that directors
cannot objectively decide if shareholder's claim has merit).
27. See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a
Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUm. L. REv. 261, 280-81 (1981) [hereinafter Coffee &
Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit] (arguing that state and federal courts erroneously
have viewed board's decision to assume or decline shareholder's claim as extension of business
judgment because decision occurs in context of normal business decision); infra notes 29-30 and
accompanying text (discussing theory that suggests that board of directors cannot decide objec-
tively whether to bring shareholder's claim).
28. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing structural bias theory).
29. See Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312, 1321 n.5 (D. Conn. 1981) (defining structural
bias theory) rev'd, 690 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). See generally Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival
of the Derivative Suit, supra note 27, at 283 (discussing existence of structural bias in board
decisions and offering empirical evidence in support of structural bias theory); Cox & Mun-
singer, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate
Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Summer 1985) (discussing potential for structural
bias on board); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65
CORNELL L. REv. 600, 619-26 (1980) [hereinafter Note, The Business Judgment Rule] (discussing
structural bias theory).
Courts and commentators usually consider the existence of structural bias in the context
of a special litigation committee. See Joy, 519 F. Supp. at 1321 (observing that courts have
recognized potential for self-dealing or structural bias in special litigation committees); see also
ALl PRINCLES OF COR'ORATE GOVEuANCE (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 1, at § 7.08
comment, at 113 (observing that many commentators have debated as to whether structural
bias affects litigation committees). See generally D. BLocK, N. BARTON & S. RADiN, supra
note 12, at 281-85 (discussing Second and Sixth Circuits' consideration of structural bias in
special litigation committees in Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S.
471 (1979); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982); and Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty
Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984)); Branson, The American Law Institute Principles of
Corporate Governance and the Derivative Action: A View from the Other Side, 43 WASH. &
LEE L. Rav. 399 (1986) (discussing problem of structural bias in special litigation committee).
A board of directors has the power to appoint a special committee of disinterested directors
for the purpose of determining whether the board should pursue the shareholder's claim on
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the board of directors, and because directors enjoy the status and economic
gain that accompany a directorial position, the incentive and pressure to
comply with the majority, or with a dominating board member, frustrates
the ability of the board members to act with the requisite disinterest in
decision-making. 0 The potential for structural bias, therefore, negates the
presumption that directors competently and objectively can exercise the
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care when a shareholder brings a claim
against the board on behalf of a corporation.
3 1
In addition to judicial reliance on the business judgment of directors in
evaluating a shareholder's claim, federal courts have noted several additional
behalf of the corporation. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 623-25, 393 N.E.2d 996-
97, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922-23 (1979); see also Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d
372, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1984) (discussing structural biases inherent in special litigation committee).
Contra Bach v. National W. Life Ins. Co., 810 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 1987) (Colorado courts
refuse to concede that structural bias results in inescapable directorial self-interest because
adoption of structural bias view would reduce value of special litigation committees). Structural
bias, however, can occur on either a board or in a special litigation committee because peer
pressure and group loyalty exist in any group and thus encourage conformity to the group
norm. Cf. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADiN, supra note 12, at 280 (both board of directors
and special litigation committee must evaluate shareholder's claim in disinterested manner).
See generally I. JAmNs, GROUP'H NK (1983) (discussing difficulty of obtaining objective decisions
from groups because of psychological factors such as peer pressure and group loyalty, which
affect each individual's decision-making process).
One set of commentators has observed that a minority of the state and federal courts
considering the demand issue are concerned with the potential for structural bias in special
litigation committees. See generally D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 12, at 285
(discussing minority and majority views on committee disinterestedness). The majority of courts
focus on whether the committee can evaluate the shareholder's claim without the influence of
outside factors affecting the committee's decision. Id. Representing the majority view, the
Supreme Court of Delaware in Kaplan v. Wyatt, for example, stated that an independent
director must be capable of considering the merits of the shareholder's claim rather than
succumbing to extraneous considerations and influences. Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184,
1189 (D. Del. 1985). To determine a committee's objectivity in assessing the merits of a
shareholder's claim, a court examines the particular facts of each individual case. See D.
BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 12, at 285-90 (describing facts courts consider in
evaluating committee disinterestedness).
30. See Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1984)
(recognizing that problems of peer pressure naturally exist when majority of directors select
members of board, and suggesting that pressure may override any independence or disinterest
of directors); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y. 2d 619, 633, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 928 (1979) (observing that even outside, independent directors may not succeed in
investigating actions of colleagues in disinterested manner because of potential personal
liability); see also D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADiN, supra note 12, at 281 (personal, familial,
and economic relationships to other defendants may bias otherwise disinterested director);
Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit, supra note 27, at 283 (corporate
process of director selection and socialization will lead directors to protect board); Note, The
Business Judgment Rule, supra note 29, at 620-21 (board appointee gains status, economic
benefit, and social attachments that lead directors to follow decisions of senior management).
31. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing doubts as to whether board
can consider merits of shareholder's claim in disinterested manner).
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practical advantages that support enforcement of the demand requirement. 2
Directors possess more knowledge about the corporation's affairs and
operations than a shareholder possesses, and thus can judge better the merits
of a shareholder's complaint.3 3 Similarly, a shareholder does not have easy
access to the books and records of a corporation, and the shareholder,
therefore, would be at a disadvantage in the prosecution of a derivative
suit.3 4 If the board does decide to take control of the suit, the board can
utilize the corporation's abundant resources." In making demand on the
board, a shareholder informs the directors that a problem exists and provides
the directors with an opportunity to remedy the problem prior to resorting
to costly and unnecessary litigation.36 Finally, requiring that a shareholder
make demand on the directors prevents strike suits, or suits that shareholders
bring primarily for the settlement value, and generally deters meritless
actions intended to harass the corporation.3 7 The demand requirement,
32. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing practical advantages of
requiring shareholder to make demand on directors of corporation before commencing deriv-
ative suit).
33. See Reilly Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Savings & Loan Ass'n, 568 F.
Supp. 1067, 1075 (E.D. Va. 1983) (making demand on directors may allow corporate directors,
who have superior knowledge of corporation's affairs, to assume control of suit on behalf of
corporation); see also Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 171-
72 (directors can evaluate merits of action brought on behalf of corporation more capably
than shareholders).
34. See Matter of Consumers Power Company Derivative Litig., IIl F.R.D. 419, 424
(E.D. Mich. 1986) (shareholder possesses less information than directors because shareholder
has less access to corporate books and records than directors); see also Note, The Demand
and Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 171-72 (shareholder does not have opportunity
to view all corporation's books and records).
35. Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1983) (directors can employ corpo-
ration's finances if board decides to assume shareholder's claim on behalf of corporation);
Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litigation, Ill F.R.D. 419, 424 (E.D. Mich 1986);
Reilly Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Savings & Loan Ass'n, 568 F. Supp. 1067,
1075 (E.D. Va. 1983) (same). If the board of directors decides to assume control of a
shareholder's suit, the directors may receive the benefit of corporate information, personnel,
counsel, and funds. Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 171-72.
36. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Brody v. Chemical
Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975) for proposition that demand requirement provides
corporation opportunity to assume suit brought on corporation's behalf, and allows directors
chance to perform directorial duties); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp. 582 F.2d 259,
275 (3d Cir. 1978) (demand requirement allows corporate management to pursue alternative
remedies and thus prevent unnecessary litigation); Reilly Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Mount
Vernon Savings & Loan Ass'n, 568 F. Supp. 1067, 1075 (E.D. Va. 1983) (demand rule forces
shareholder to exhaust intracorporate remedies); see also Note, The Demand and Standing
Requirements, supra note 2, at 171-72 (demand requirement provides corporation with oppor-
tunity, through directors, to remedy wrong internally); Note, Demand on Directors, supra note
7, at 748-49 (same).
37. Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983); see Matter of Consumers Power
Co. Derivative Litig., Ill F.R.D. 419, 424 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (demand requirement helps
curtail strike suits); Reilly Mortgage Group Inc. v. Mount Vernon Savings & Loan Ass'n, 568
F. Supp. 1067, 1075 (E.D. Va. 1983) (demand rule permits termination of meritless actions
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therefore, serves a useful function in promoting the interests of both the
corporation and corporate shareholders.
3
Although federal courts agree on the importance of requiring a share-
holder to exhaust intracorporate remedies before permitting the shareholder
to proceed with a derivative action, the courts do not agree on the standards
that a shareholder must meet to demonstrate compliance with the demand
requirement.3 9 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan recently attempted to define a more precise standard in Matter of
Consumers Power Company Derivative Litigation.4 In Consumers Power,
several individual shareholders consolidated their actions into one suit in
which the shareholders alleged that the directors of Consumers Power
Company (Consumers) mismanaged the construction of the Midland, Mich-
igan Power Plant (Midland plant).4' Serious management problems plagued
the Midland project from the start, resulting in large cost overruns and
long delays. 42 Among their complaints against the directors of Consumers,
the plaintiffs alleged that the directors had concealed the construction
problems and financial difficulties from the public, unjustifiably had forecast
with optimism the completion of the project, and had inflated Consumers'
earnings. 43 Additionally, the shareholders alleged that the directors failed to
keep an interested party, Dow Chemical Company (Dow), abreast of the
construction delays. 44 Dow subsequently sued Consumers. 45 Consumers fi-
nally abandoned the Midland project in 1984, but the Consumers share-
holders sought to hold the directors accountable to the corporation for the
damage that the company suffered. 46 The shareholders subsequently com-
menced a derivative suit.
47
intended to vex or harass corporation); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984)
(demand rule acts as safeguard against meritless strike suits); see also Note, The Demand and
Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 171-72 (demand requirement reduces frivolous suits
against corporation).
38. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing practical reasons for
requiring shareholder to make demand on directors).
39. See infra notes 63-119 and accompanying text (discussing varying applications at
federal level of legal standards concerning demand requirement).
40. 111 F.R.D. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
41. Id. at 420. In Consumers Power, after conducting a feasibility study, Consumers
Power Company (Consumers) entered into a contract with Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
in 1967 to construct a two-unit nuclear power plant in Midland, Michigan. Id. Consumers
and Bechtel scheduled completion of the project for 1975 at a cost of $256 million. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 421.
44. Id. In Matter of Consumers Power Company Derivative Litigation, Consumers
Power Company (Consumers) had promised to keep Dow Chemical Company (Dow) informed
of all construction activities, including delays, because Dow contracted to purchase large
quantities of cogenerated steam from Consumers upon completion of the Midland plant. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 420-22.
47. Id.
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Filing a derivative action to redress the harm inflicted on Consumers,
the plaintiffs alleged futility of demand on ten grounds. 41 The shareholders
primarily based their excuses for futility of demand on the board members'
participation, acquiescence, or approval of the continued mismanagement
of the Midland plant. 49 The shareholders contended that the mismanagement
constituted a breach of the directors' duty of care to the corporation. 0 The
shareholders also averred that the directors breached the duty of loyalty to
the corporation.5 In pleading a breach of the duty of loyalty, the plaintiffs
claimed that the directors' continued mismanagement of the Midland project
placed the directors in a position of irreconcilable conflict with the interests
of the corporation.5 2 In addition to claiming a conflict of interest, the
shareholders charged the directors who profited from misconduct with acting
in their self-interest 3. 5 Finally, the shareholders alleged a breach of the duty
of loyalty on the ground that two directors dominated and controlled the
board to the extent that a court reasonably could not expect the board to
consider impartially the shareholders' claim.14 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan considered whether the share-




In assessing the shareholders' allegations of demand futility, the district
court held that breaching the duty of care does not constitute grounds for
excusing demand under Rule 23.1 .56 The Consumers Power court held,
therefore, that the plaintiffs' allegations of demand futility based on a
breach of the duty of care would not excuse demand.5 7 The Consumers
Power court declared that in order to claim demand futility, and to maintain
the vitality of Rule 23.1, a shareholder must allege with particularity that
48. Id. at 425-26.
49. Id. at 425. To further support the shareholders' allegations of demand futility, the
shareholders in Consumers Power contended that the majority of the director/defendants
participated in the mismanagement of the Midland plant. Id.
50. See id. (describing plaintiffs' allegations against Consumers directors, and plaintiffs'
reasons for failing to make demand on directors); see also supra note 21 and accompanying
text (discussing concept of duty of care in context of derivative action). In addition to
contending that the director/defendants participated in the long-term mismanagement, miscon-
duct, and waste with respect to the Midland plant, the shareholders in Consumers Power
claimed demand futility on the ground that the board of directors issued materially false and
misleading proxy statements. Consumers Power, 111 F.R.D. at 425.
51. Consumers Power, Ill F.R.D. at 425-26; see supra notes 19 & 20 and accompanying
text (discussing concept of duty of loyalty).
52. Consumers Power, 111 F.R.D. at 425-26.
53. Id. at 425.
54. Id. at 425-26. The shareholders in Consumers Power alleged that certain director/
defendants personally profited from the injurious transaction when the directors received
wrongful payments through an executive compensation plan. Id.
55. Id. at 426-28.
56. Id. at 422-24.
57. Id. at 426-28.
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the directors breached the duty of loyalty.58 The court rejected the share-
holders' allegation of demand futility because the court declared that the
Consumers shareholders failed to allege with sufficient particularity that the
directors breached the duty of loyalty. 59 Consequently, the court dismissed
the complaint without prejudice on the ground that the allegations did not
state sufficient grounds to excuse demand.60
In evaluating the sufficiency of the Consumers shareholders' allegations,
the Consumers Power court surveyed the decisions of several courts to
determine the appropriate standard to apply in judging demand futility
under Rule 23.1.61 The Consumers Power court observed that the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits generally have
been liberal in excusing shareholders from making demand on the direc-
tors. 62 In Liboff v. Wilson,63 for example, the complaining shareholder
commenced a derivative action and alleged only that demand would have
been futile because the majority of the directors approved of, acquiesced
in, and participated in the injurious transaction, and that the directors could
not have pursued the action diligently because the directors would have had
to sue themselves. 64 The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with Rule 23.1 .65
The shareholders appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit."
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered both the general approach to
the rules of pleading as well as the specific requirements of Rule 23.1 to
determine whether the trial court erred in dismissing the shareholder's
complaint. 67 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the complaint alleged with
58. Id. at 423-24.
59. Id. at 426-28.
60. Id. at 426 & 428. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan in Consumers Power dismissed the complaint without prejudice to allow the share-
holders to make demand on the directors. Id. at 428. The court stated that the shareholders
could file suit again if the directors wrongfully refused to take action. Id.
61. Id. at 422-25; see infra notes 63-119 and aqcompanying text (discussing Consumers
Power court's consideration of precedent that applies varying standards of demand futility).
62. Consumers Power, 111 F.R.D. at 423-24; see infra notes 63-90 and accompanying
text (discussing precedent that broadly construes demand requirement and liberally excuses
demand).
63. 437 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
64. Id. at 122.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The basis of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's lenience
in insisting on demand in Liboff v. Wilson stems from the court's flexible interpretation of
modern notice pleading. See Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D.
419, 423-24 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (Fifth Circuit interprets demand liberally in accordance with
flexible standard of modern notice pleading); see also Note, The Demand and Standing
Requirements, supra note 2, at 170 (recognizing differing standards of notice pleading as basis
for distinctions among courts regarding sufficiency of compliance with Rule 23.1). Rule 8(a)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only that a plaintiff provide the court with
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sufficient particularity the shareholder's reasons for failing to make demand
on the directors.6" Although the shareholder alleged only that the majority
of the directors breached the duty of care by participating in, approving
of, or acquiescing in the improper transaction, the Fifth Circuit excused
demand on the ground that the directors could not consider impartially the
possibility of suing themselves. 69 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, reversed the
trial court's order of dismissal of the complaint because the plaintiffs
adequately had satisfied the demand requirement.
70
In Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corporation,71 the Fifth Circuit
again addressed the sufficiency of a shareholder's compliance with the de-
mand requirement. 72 The shareholders in Clark initially attacked the corporate
management's use of misleading proxy statements distributed to shareholders
to obtain shareholder votes in a merger transaction. 73 When the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas approved a settlement agree-
ment between the corporation and the defendants without the plaintiffs' knowl-
edge, the shareholders attacked the settlement. 74 The plaintiffs asserted that
a short and plain statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. FED. R. Crv. P.
'8(a)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also interprets demand
according to the standard of modern notice pleading. See Consumers Power, 111 F.R.D. at
423-24 (citing deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Company, 286 F. Supp. 809, 813-14 (D. Colo.
1968), aff'd 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970) to support proposition that courts excusing demand
liberally employ flexible standard of modern notice pleading); see also Note, The Demand and
Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 170 (observing that Tenth Circuit interprets demand
in accordance with flexible standard of modern notice pleading). The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit has rejected, however, the notice pleading interpretation of Rule
23.1. See Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 170 (citing In re
Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 1973) for proposition that First
Circuit has rejected notice pleading interpretation). The First Circuit in In re Kauffman Mutual
Fund Actions asserted that Rule 23.1 is an exceptional rule of pleading that requires special
interpretation because Rule 23.1 contains both substantive and procedural aspects. In re
Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857
(1973).
68. Liboff, 437 F.2d at 122.
69. Id. In arriving at the conclusion that the shareholder in Liboff stated with sufficient
particularity his reason for failing to make demand, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit considered evidence presented at oral argument concerning the truth of the
allegation that certain directors controlled the board. Id.
70. Id.
71. 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981).
72. Id. at 53-54.
73. Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 79 F.R.D. 641, 643-44 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
vacated, 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs in Clark filed a securities fraud complaint
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas requesting individual and
derivative relief. Clark, 79 F.R.D. at 643. The plaintiffs alleged securities and state law viola-
tions in connection with a merger of the shareholders' corporation and the company's two
wholly-owned subsidiaries. Id. The plaintiffs also charged the corporate directors with breaches
of fiduciary duties in the preparation and solicitation of proxy statements for the merger. Id.
at 643-44.
74. Id. at 652, 657-58. The shareholders in Clark attacked the settlement agreement on
the grounds that the settlement placed the board in a conflict of interest, that the settlement
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the board could not have made an independent judgment about the settle-
ment because the two named defendants, the corporation's president and
the corporation's largest corporate shareholder, controlled the majority of
the company's outstanding shares of stock .7 5 The district court declared that
the board could have made an independent judgment about the settlement
offer.7 6 As a result, the plaintiffs appealed the judgment for a settlement
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuity.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the shareholders in Clark challenged the
trial court's refusal to recognize that the controlling shareholders influenced
the settlement terms and that the board, therefore, could not decide com-
petently whether to pursue the plaintiff's action.78 Analogizing an evaluation
of director interest in settlement cases to determinations of director interest
in demand cases, the Fifth Circuit stated that if the named defendants con-
trol the majority of the corporation's outstanding shares of stock, a court
should presume demand futility. 79 The court reasoned that when a defendant
owns a controlling share of the company's stock, the directors cannot decide
competently whether to pursue an action against the controlling shareholder.8 "
The Clark court refused to ignore the potential for structural bias that could
exist on a corporate board.8" As in Liboff, the Fifth Circuit in Clark con-
sidered the shareholder's allegation of demand futility in the context of a breach
of the duty of care."
was not fair, adequate and reasonable, that the negotiators had colluded to obtain a settlement
that protected a director who was the majority shareholder from personal liability, and that
the shareholders should have received notice of the settlement. Id. at 649-53. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas declared that the amount and terms approved
by the corporation's board of directors for the settlement of the shareholders' derivative action
was adequate, fair and reasonable, and the court found no evidence to support the shareholders'
remaining objections to the settlement agreement. Id. at 652.
75. Clark, 625 F.2d at 52. The president of the corporation in Clark owned approximate-
ly 45% of the company's stock, and the defendant corporation owned approximately 11%. Id.
at 52 n.4.
76. Clark, 79 F.R.D. at 649. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas declared in Clark that the board of directors that approved a settlement agreement
between the corporation and the defendants did not consist of the same board members who
sat on the board at the time of the allegedly injurious transaction, and that the board thus was
disinterested sufficiently to evaluate objectively the settlement proposal. Id.
77. Clark, 625 F.2d at 51.
78. Id. at 53.
79. Id. In vacating and remanding the judgment for a settlement to the district court,
the Fifth Circuit in Clark cautioned that requiring a showing of director interest for the
purpose of determining demand futility under Rule 23.1 is a more strenuous standard than
the standard that requires a showing that the directors were not disinterested in approving or
rejecting a proposal to settle a claim. Id. at 54 n.5.
80. Id. at 54.
81. Id. at 53; see supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing structural bias
theory).
82. Clark, 625 F.2d at 53.
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Like the Fifth Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit bases evaluations of demand futility on a duty of care standard,
and thus liberally excuses demand when a shareholder has alleged that
demand would be futile. 3 In deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Company, 4 four
shareholders commenced a derivative action to attack the issuance of mis-
leading proxy statements used to ascertain the success of a merger trans-
action.85 One of the named defendants held important management offices
and significant ownership interests in all the corporations involved in the
transactions . 6 The plaintiffs requested the court to excuse demand on the
ground that the directors could not decide objectively -whether to take
control of the shareholders' claim because the minority of the directors
controlled the majority. 7 The United States District Court for the District
of Colorado concluded that to require shareholders to make demand of a
board comprised of two hostile directors and three outside directors who
had no interest in the corporation's affairs would be unrealistic. 8 Addi-
tionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the two hostile minority directors dom-
inated the three outside directors who comprised the majority. 9 On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's decision and agreed with the trial court's reasoning that demand
would have been futile. 90
83. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968) (excusing
demand on basis of alleged breach of duty of care), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir.
1970).
84. 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
85. Id. at 1225. In deHaas, Empire Petroleum Company (Empire) solely owned the
Mutual Supply Company (Mutual) and American Industries, Incorporated (American). Id.
Additionally, Empire effectively controlled the Inland Development Corporation (Inland),
owning 43% of Inland's stock. Id. In 1962, Empire sold Mutual to American, and American
and Inland subsequently merged, with American as the survivor. Id. Inland allegedly failed to
disclose, among other things, that American had issued Empire interest-bearing notes totaling
$259,000 to purchase Mutual, that Mutual was a losing operation, and that American expected
to satisfy Mutual's debts with Inland's assets. Id.; see deHaas, 286 F. Supp. at 812 (listing proxy
statement's alleged misrepresentation and omissions). The American shareholders sued on behalf
of American because American incurred substantial losses after the merger with Inland. deHaas,
435 F.2d at 1225. American lost over $318,000 in its efforts to operate Mutual. Id.
86. deHaas, 435 F.2d at 1225. In deHaas, defendant Stone was president, chairman of
the board, and chief executive officer of Empire Petroleum Company, Mutual Supply Company,
and American Industries, Incorporated. deHaas, 286 F. Supp. at 812. Stone also was president
as well as a director of Inland Development Corporation. Id.
87. deHaas, 286 F. Supp. at 814. The defendant and the only other inside director in
deHaas allegedly dominated the remaining three members of the board. Id. Additionally, the
two allegedly controlling inside directors of the corporation elected the three outside directors.
Id. Moreover, the shareholders alleged that the three outside directors would not have taken
an active interest in the suit'due to the outside directors' lack of interest in the corporation's
affairs. Id.
88. Id. at 814-15.
89. Id.
90. deHaas, 435 F.2d at 1228.
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Contrary to the Tenth Circuit's decision in deHaas to liberally excuse
demand, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re
Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions9' refused to excuse demand when the
shareholder alleged, among other things, that a minority of the board of
directors controlled the majority.92 In Kauffman, the plaintiff brought a
derivative action on behalf of certain mutual funds in which he was a
shareholder (Kauffman funds). 9 The plaintiff asserted antitrust and Invest-
ment Company Act violations against the defendants. 94 With regard to the
antitrust claim, the shareholder alleged that the fund directors who had
affiliated with investment advisers had conspired with the advisers and other
parties to fix excessive noncompetitive management fee schedules based
solely on the funds' average net assets. 95 Filing his complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, the shareholder alleged
seven reasons for his failure to make demand on the directors of the
Kauffman funds. 96 Among his excuses, the shareholder asserted that demand
would have been futile, that the fund directors affiliated with the external
advisers had dominated and controlled the personnel, policies, and directors
of the funds, and that the conspiracy involved the self-dealing directors. 97
The plaintiff also contended that all of the named defendants acquiesced,
encouraged, cooperated, and assisted in the conspiracy.98 The trial court
found that the shareholder's allegations were insufficient to excuse demand
and subsequently dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. 99
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
the plaintiff challenged the district court's finding that the shareholder's
failure to make demand on the directors of the Kauffman funds rendered
his suit unactionable.'0 Applying an analysis similar to the analysis the
Consumers Power court employed, the Kauffman court first stated that an
unsupported allegation that the directors and advisers dominated and con-
trolled the board does not satisfy the demand futility requirement. 0' Second,
91. 479 F.2d 257, 264 (1st Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 261. In Kauffman, the plaintiff held shares in four mutual funds collectively
called the "Kauffman funds." Id. The plaintiff named as defendants 65 mutual funds, 38
external investment advisers, as well as 37 directors of the Investment Company Institute, and
the mutual fund industry's trade association. Kauffman, 337 F. Supp. 1337, 1338 (J.P.M.L.
1972).
94. Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 261.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 262; see also supra text accompanying notes 97 & 98 (summarizing pertinent
allegations of demand futility).
97. Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 262.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 263.
100. Id. at 261.
101. Id. at 264. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit observed in
Kauffman that the allegedly self-interested, affiliated directors constituted less than a majority
of the board. Id. The court acknowledged that a presumption of futility exists when a majority
allegedly controls the board of directors. Id.
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the Kauffman court ruled that an allegation that a minority of the directors
of the Kauffman funds participated in the conspiracy to set excessive fee
schedules was insufficient to excuse demand. 0 2 Finally, the First Circuit
declared that mere directorial approval of the transaction, absent self-interest
or other bias, ordinarily will not excuse demand.103 Due to the shareholder's
conclusory allegations, which the facts did not support, the First Circuit
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint.2 4 The First Circuit's
refusal to excuse demand on an allegation of director participation or
approval indicates the First Circuit's insistence that a shareholder allege a
breach of the duty of loyalty. 05
In Lewis v. Graves,'06 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit demonstrated compliance with the standard of futility adopted by
the First Circuit in Kauffman, which requires an allegation of the breach
of the duty of loyalty. 07 In Graves, the plaintiff brought a derivative action
in which the plaintiff challenged as improper the corporation's acquisition
and subsequent merger with another company.' The shareholder also
attacked as improper the corporation's issuance of stock to corporate
officers and directors.tc 9 The plaintiff failed to make demand on the directors
of the corporation before commencing the derivative action."0 Accordingly,
the plaintiff alleged demand futility on the ground that all of the directors
participated, assisted, aided and abetted in, and benefitted from the allegedly
injurious transactions.' The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed the shareholder's complaint, ruling that the
allegations of demand futility did not satisfy the Rule 23.1 requirement of
particularity." 2 The plaintiff subsequently appealed the trial court's decision
102. Id. The Kauffman court criticized the plaintiff's failure to name in the complaint
the unaffiliated directors who might have voted objectively on Kauffman's demand. Id.
103. Id. at 265.
104. Id. at 263-64.
105. Compare In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 261-63 (1st Cir.
1973) (circumstances leading to shareholder's allegations of demand futility) cert denied, 414
U.S. 857 (1973) with ALI P NcIPLES OF CORORATE GOVERNANCE (Tent. Draft No. 3), supra
note 20, at §§ 5.08-5.13, at 107-230 (describing situations in which director breaches duty of
loyalty).
106. 701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1983).
107. Compare Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1983) (circumstances leading to
shareholder's allegations of demand futility) with ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(Tent. Draft No. 3), supra note 20, at §§ 5.08-5.13, at 107-230 (describing situations in which
director breaches duty of loyalty).
108. Graves, 701 F.2d at 246. The plaintiff in Graves contended that the corporation's
directors approved of a stock acquisition and merger with another company merely to secure
their positions as directors of the corporation. Id. at 249.
109. Id. at 246. The shareholder in Graves alleged that five of the corporation's I1
directors received impermissible grants of corporate stock. Id. at 249.
110. Id. at 247.
111. Id. at 246-47.
112. Id. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York would
have allowed the plaintiff in Graves to refile the complaint within 30 days if the plaintiff had
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to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit." 3
In examining the appeal from the district court, the Second Circuit
evaluated the plaintiff's allegations of demand futility after considering the
purpose of the demand requirement and reviewing other federal circuit court
opinions." 4 The Second Circuit agreed with the trial court's holding that
mere directorial approval of and acquiescence in an injurious transaction,
without specific allegations of director self-dealing or bias, does not ex-
cuse demand." 5 Although the Graves court acknowledged that the plaintiff
had alleged that the corporation's directors acted with self-interest, the
Second Circuit found that the shareholder had failed to support the alle-
gations with sufficient facts. 1 6 Additionally, the Graves court declared that
merely naming as defendants more than a majority of the board of directors
would not excuse demand." 7 Because the Graves court concluded that the
plaintiff had not alleged with sufficient particularity his reasons for claiming
demand futility, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the com-
plaint."' The Second Circuit thus joined the First Circuit in representing
the federal courts that require a shareholder to particularize allegations of
demand futility which amount to a breach of the duty of loyalty, and
conflicted with the more lenient Fifth and Tenth Circuits that require a share-
holder to base an allegation of demand futility on a breach of the duty of
care.
119
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
in Matter of Consumers Power Company Derivative Litigation properly
followed the decisions of the First and Second Circuits in developing a
standard of demand futility based on a breach of the duty of loyalty because
the stricter standard better encourages shareholder compliance with the
made demand on the directors and the directors subsequently had refused to take action
because refusal to litigate the claim would have been wrongful. Id. at 247. The plaintiff
declined to make a demand on the directors. Id.
113. Id. at 247.
114. Id. at 247-48.
115. Id. at 248. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Graves
stated that to excuse demand merely because the directors approved of the allegedly wrongful
action would obviate the necessity for demand and dilute the purpose of Rule 23.1. Id.; see
supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of demand requirement).
116. Graves, 701 F.2d at 249.
117. Id. at 248-49.
118. Id. at 248-50.
119. Compare Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983) (refusing to excuse
demand absent allegation of director bias or other interest) and In re Kauffman Mutual Fund
Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 264-68 (Ist Cir. 1973) (refusing to excuse demand when plaintiff failed
to support allegation of domination and control with particularity, and when directors merely
participated in or approved of the contested transaction) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973)
with Liboff v. Wilson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971) (excusing demand when plaintiffs
alleged that directors participated in, approved of, or acquiesced in injurious transaction) and
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1970) (excusing demand
when hostile minority allegedly dominated majority of board).
ALLEGING DEMAND FUTILITY
demand requirement.'12 Federal courts impose a demand requirement on
shareholders to force the shareholders to exhaust intracorporate remedies
before resorting to the extraordinary remedy of derivative litigation, and
simultaneously to prevent a court from intervening in the corporation's
internal affairs.' 2' The Consumers Power court recognized that a standard
of demand futility based on a breach of the duty of care does not satisfy
the aims of the demand rule.'" The Consumers Power court realized that
a shareholder easily could allege that the board approved of a transaction
that resulted in injury to the corporation, an accusation which amounts to
an alleged breach of the duty of care.' 23 Liberal excuse of demand will
force courts to intervene in the corporation's affairs, contrary to the purpose
of the demand requirement, and will burden the courts with both frivolous
and meritorious derivative actions.'2A Although a liberal standard of demand
futility will bring more suits before a court and thus minimize the risk that
a board improperly will refuse to litigate a meritorious action, the Consumers
Power court recognized that a standard of demand futility based on a
breach of the duty of care also increases the likelihood that a court will
spend unnecessary time considering frivolous claims.1 25 Furthermore, re-
quiring a shareholder to make demand is a relatively costless step with little
burden on the plaintiff. 26 Allowing a shareholder to allege merely that the
board breached the duty of care also will deny the directors a chance to
remedy the wrong before resorting to burdensome litigation.127 Moreover,
the Consumers Power court's requirement that a shareholder allege a breach
of the stricter duty of loyalty is more meaningful in light of the recent
decisions of some state legislatures to lower the standard of the duty of
care.'2 The Consumers Power court, therefore, purposely rejected a standard
120. See infra notes 121-45 and accompanying text (discussing grounds.for asserting that
Consumers Power standard encourages shareholders to comply with demand requirement).
121. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text (discussing purpose and function of
demand requirement).
122. See Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419, 424 (E.D.
Mich. 1986) (federal courts should construe exception to demand rule narrowly to achieve
purpose of Rule 23.1 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
123. Id.; see supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing duty of care).
124. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (recognizing that courts are reluctant to
intervene in corporation's private affairs).
125. See Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419, 424 (E.D.
Mich. 1986) (extending inquiry into merits of shareholder's claim is inappropriate when court
is considering whether shareholder exhausted intracorporate remedies).
126. ALI PRINCiPLES OF CoRaomTE GovNAsacE (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 1, at
§ 7.03 comment c, at 60.
127. See supra notes 4 & 16 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for allowing
directors to assume control of shareholder's suit, and practical reasons for forcing shareholder
to exhaust intracorporate remedies).
128. Md. Bill Would Cut Liability of Corporation Directors, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 1986,
at 1, col. 4. In order to reduce potential liability of corporate directors, many states, such as
Maryland, Virginia, Indiana, and Louisiana, have lowered duty of care standards to require
shareholders to prove that the directors acted with willful misconduct or deliberate recklessness.
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of demand futility based on a breach of the duty of care because the lenient
standard less effectively accomplishes the demand requirement's aim of
encouraging shareholders to present to the board the opportunity to assert
the corporation's rights before commencing a derivative suit.
2 9
The Consumers Power court not only rejected a liberal standard of
demand futility, but the court also correctly concluded that a strict standard
better encourages a shareholder to comply with the demand requirement. 30
The court contended that evaluating an alleged breach of the duty of care
involves an extended inquiry into the merits of the case, an inquiry that
should not occur solely for the purpose of determining compliance with the
demand requirement. 3 ' Although acknowledging the importance of a deriv-
ative action as a means of redressing harms to the corporation and as a
method of encouraging directors to act responsibly with respect to corporate
affairs, the Consumers Power court also recognized the potential for share-
holders to become overzealous in their efforts to protect the corporation. 132
The Consumers Power court asserted, therefore, that a court should provide
rules to prevent shareholders from becoming overly enthusiastic in enforce-
ment actions.'33 The Consumers Power court also focused on related pur-
poses for requiring demand, such as the need to curtail strike suits and the
need to place control of the litigation in the hands of the corporation,
which has more resources and records. 3 4 The court concluded that to best
serve the interests of the shareholders and the corporation, a court should
interpret the demand requirement narrowly and insist upon demand in
Id. Historically, state courts have required a shareholder to demonstrate to the court that the
director accused of breaching the duty of care failed to exercise the care that a reasonably
prudent person would use in similar circumstances. Id. Under a lower duty of care standard
a shareholder must demonstrate that the director intended to cause the harm to the corporation.
Id.; see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing duty of care that director owes
to corporation and shareholders).
129. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for approving of
Consumers Power court's development of standard of demand futility based on breach of
duty of loyalty).
130. See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text (describing basis for asserting that
Consumers Power encourages shareholder to comply with demand requirement).
131. Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419, 424 (E.D. Mich.
1986).
132. Id. at 424. The Consumers Power court noted that the United States Supreme Court
has recognized the need to regulate overzealous shareholders from prosecuting every transaction
that did not benefit the corporation. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 530
(1984) (shareholder could undermine purpose of derivative action if shareholder could bring
derivative action indiscriminately); see also Allison on Behalf of General Motors Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (D. Del. 1985) (approving Supreme Court's
observation in Daily Income Fund, Inc. concerning need to constrain overzealous shareholders
from constantly asserting derivative actions).




almost every situation by requiring a shareholder to make demand absent
a particularized allegation of self-dealing or other bias. 35
The Consumers Power decision does not represent the only precedent
that recognizes the advantage of requiring a shareholder to make demand
on directors whenever possible before commencing a derivative action.
36
The Consumers Power standard for determining demand futility reflects the
majority view among the federal courts. 37 Most courts reject a shareholder's
allegation of demand futility based on the theory that a court reasonably
could not expect directors to bring suit against themselves. 38 Contrary to
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Liboff v. Wilson, and in accordance with the
First Circuit's decision in In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, most courts
will not excuse demand when a shareholder alleges only that the directors
approved of an injurious transaction.? 9 The majority of courts recognize
135. See id. (standard of demand futility based on breach of duty of loyalty is most
appropriate standard to impose on shareholder to encourage compliance with demand require-
ment).
136. See infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text (recognizing that Consumers Power
court followed majority view in establishing strict standard of demand futility).
137. See infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text (recognizing that Consumers Power
court adopted view of majority of federal courts considering issue of demand futility).
138. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1983) (Second Circuit rejects
proposition that court automatically should excuse demand when shareholder names all directors
as defendants); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 785 (3d Cir. 1982) (to excuse demand whenever
shareholder named majority of directors in complaint would eviscerate Rule 23.1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and to assert demand futility on ground that directors would not
consider suing themselves is insufficient reason to excuse demand) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1162 (Ist Cir. 1977) (merely naming directors as defendants
does not relieve shareholder of duty to make demand on directors prior to commencing
derivative action); Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419, 427
(E.D. Mich. 1986) (observing that federal courts have refused to excuse demand when plaintiff
alleges that directors would be forced to sue themselves); Allison on Behalf of General Motors
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1115 (D. Del. 1985) (citing Lewis v.
Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1982) for proposition that court will not excuse demand if
shareholder only alleges that directors would be suing themselves), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1026 (3d
Cir. 1983); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 818 (Del. 1984) (recognizing that excusing demand
only because shareholder claims that directors would be forced to sue themselves abrogates
Rule 23.1 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and weakens directors' managerial power).
139. See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983) (recognizing that
numerous courts refuse to excuse demand merely on allegation that director approved of, or
acquiesced in contested transaction); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115, 124 (Ist Cir. 1982)
(allegation that directors participated in, or approved of injurious transaction is insufficient
to excuse demand) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 785 (3d
Cir. 1982) (conclusory allegations that directors participated in injurious transaction does not
render demand futile) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Greenspun v. Del E. Wvebb Corp.,
634 F.2d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 1980) (allegation of demand futility requires more than directorial
approval of, or participation in allegedly injurious transaction); In re Kauffman Mutual Fund
Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 264-65 (1st Cir. 1973) (directorial participation in, or approval of
contested transaction does not excuse demand) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 85 (1973); Matter of
Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419, 426 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (allegation
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that a complaining shareholder easily could allege that certain conduct
harmed the corporation and that the directors who initially approved the
transaction, therefore, acted negligently in authorizing the subsequently
injurious transaction. 40 The Consumers Power court recognized, as the
Second Circuit in Lewis v. Graves did, that excusing demand on the ground
that a director approved of, or participated in, a transaction that ultimately
injured the corporation would permit a court to excuse demand in almost
every case.' 4' The Consumers Power court, therefore, refused to excuse
shareholder demand based on the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendant
directors participated in, acquiesced in, approved of, or negligently super-
vised the construction of the Midland plant. 42
The Consumers Power court also followed the majority rule in rejecting
the shareholders' conclusory allegations of directorial conflict of interest
and allegations of director domination and control of the board. 143 The
courts expounding the view that conclusory allegations of domination and
control or directorial bias will not suffice to excuse demand, such as the
Consumers Power court, the Second Circuit in Graves, and the First Circuit
in Kauffman, do not purport to suggest that an allegation of director self-
interest or domination never suffices to excuse demand. 144 Rather, the courts
insist that a shareholder support, with particular facts, an allegation of bias
that directors participated in, acquiesced in, or approved of transaction is insufficient to excuse
demand in federal court); Reilly Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 568 F. Supp. 1067, 1076 (E.D. Va. 1983) (majority rule recognizes that mere directorial
approval of, or acquiescence in, alleged misdeed does not render demand futile); see also
Block & Prussin, Termination of Derivative Suits Against Directors on Business Judgment
Grounds: From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus. LAW. 1503, 1506 (1984) (majority approval does
not imply director self-interest and thus will not excuse demand automatically); Note, The
Demand and Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 176-78 (mere director approval or
acquiescence in allegedly improper transaction does not excuse demand).
. 140. Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419, 424 (E.D. Mich.
1986).
141. Id. at 424; see Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983) (Second Circuit
will not excuse demand if shareholder only alleges that board approved of, or acquiesced in,
transaction because court would obviate need for demand in almost every situation and thus
dilute Rule 23.1 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
142. Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419, 426 (E.D. Mich.
1986).
143. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (recognizing that majority rule refuses
to excuse allegation of demand futility based on conclusory allegations, and does not excuse
demand absent allegation of directorial self-interest or domination).
144. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983) (refusing to excuse demand
absent well plead allegation that directors engaged in self-dealing or that other bias existed);
In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 264-65 (1st Cir. 1973) (plaintiff must
allege specific facts indicating directors' self-interest or alleged domination and control by
minority) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Consumers Power, 111 F.R.D. at 427-28 (plaintiffs
must allege conflict of interest or domination and control with particularity before court will
render demand futile); see also Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements, supra note 2,
at 173-75 (recognizing that majority rule requires shareholder to allege control and domination
or conflict of interest with particularity to support claim of demand futility).
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or domination and control.' 45 The Consumers Power shareholders' failure
to provide the Consumers Power court with evidence of the directors'
conflict of interest in managing the Midland plant, as well as the share-
holders' failure to support with facts the claim that the chairman of the
board of Consumers Power dominated the board, led to dismissal of the
shareholders' complaint.
46
Although the Consumers Power court followed the First and Second
Circuit standards in rejecting the shareholders' allegations of demand futil-
ity, the court interpreted somewhat broadly the First and Second Circuit
decisions because neither the First Circuit nor the Second Circuit specifically
stated that a shareholder must allege a breach of loyalty before a court will
excuse demand. 47 The Consumers Power court's interpretation, however,
reasonably follows from the First Circuit's decision in Kauffman and the
Second Circuit's decision in Graves. 41 In both cases, the First and Second
Circuits asserted that a shareholder must make demand on directors absent
an allegation of self-dealing or bias. 49 As a matter of general corporate
law, a director guilty of self-dealing has violated the fiduciary duty of
loyalty. 50 The First and Second Circuits, therefore, implicitly expect a
shareholder claiming demand futility to allege that a director breached the
duty of loyalty, and the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan extended the rationale by explicitly requiring a shareholder to
comply with the strict standard of demand futility.
Although the Consumers Power court, as well as the other federal
courts that strictly construe the demand requirement, correctly recognized
145. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (noting that courts refuse to excuse
demand based on alleged conflict of interest or domination and control if shareholder fails to
support allegation with facts).
146. See Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., IlI F.R.D. 419, 427-28
(E.D. Mich. 1986) (United States District Court for Eastern District of Michigan declared
plaintiffs' allegations of conflict of interest and domination and control too conclusory to
excuse demand).
147. Compare Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419, 423
& 424 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (claiming that First and Second Circuits require shareholder to
establish breach of duty of loyalty) with Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983)
(requiring shareholder to allege director's self-interest with particularity) and In re Kauffman
Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 264 (1st Cir. 1973) (requiring shareholder to allege
domination and control with particularity) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
148. Compare Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1983) (describing facts
leading to shareholder's allegation of demand futility) and In re Kauffman Mutual Fund
Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 262 (lst Cir. 1973) (same) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973) with ALI
PiwiNss oF CopoAmTE GovERNANCE (Tent. Draft No. 3), supra note 20, at §§ 5.08-5.13,
at 107-230 (describing situations in which director has breached duty of loyalty).
149. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983) (court will not excuse demand
if shareholder failed to allege with particularity that majority of board engaged in self-dealing
or exercised other bias); In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 265 (Ist Cir.
1973) (absent self-interest or other bias, mere director approval of transaction will not suffice
to excuse demand) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
150. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing duty of loyalty).
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that requiring a shareholder to make demand on the board in almost every
case theoretically and practically encourages compliance with Rule 23.1, the
court failed to consider whether the demand requirement is the appropriate
vehicle to accomplish the goals underlying the demand rule. Federal courts
impose a demand requirement on shareholders to provide the corporation,
through the directors, an opportunity to remedy the alleged wrong, and to
prevent courts from unnecessarily interfering in corporate affairs., The
demand requirement presumes, however, that directors objectively and im-
passionately can determine whether a shareholder's claim has merit and is
worth pursuing.1 2 If the directors cannot consider the claim objectively
under any circumstances, then the demand requirement does not fulfill the
goal of advancing meritorious claims, and neither a strict nor a lenient
standard of demand futility accomplishes the desired aim. The structural
bias theory hypothesizes that directors cannot consider a shareholder's claim
impassionately because of the members' loyalty to the board.153 Structural
bias suggests that a board member cannot exercise the fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty to the corporation if the decision to assume the sharehold-
er's claim will affect either the member's position on the board or board
unity and camaraderie. 154 By failing to consider whether the directors ob-
jectively could evaluate the shareholder's claim under a standard of demand
futility based either on the duty of care or the duty of loyalty, the Consumers
Power court evaded an important factor in developing a standard of demand
futility that ensures the advancement of meritorious claims.
55
In addition to disregarding the potential existence of structural bias in
a demand situation, the Consumers Power court also failed to consider
alternative standards of demand futility that would serve better the purpose
of the demand requirement. 156 Legislatures formulated the demand require-
151. See supra notes 12-25 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of demand
requirement).
152. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (court would err in presuming that
directors seriously would consider shareholder's claim).
153. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing structural bias in context
of derivative litigation).
154. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing potential structural bias
of directors in evaluating merit of shareholder's claim for derivative action).
155. Compare Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419, 423-
28 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (adhering to strict standard of demand futility that requires shareholder
to allege breach of duty of loyalty) with Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d
49, 53 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing potential existence of structural bias on board, and adopting
lenient standard of demand futility based on breach of duty of care) cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1029 (1980) and supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing possible effect of structural
bias on board considering shareholder's claim for derivative relief).
156. See Branson, supra note 29, at 418 (real issue in derivative actions is how to police
undesirable actions brought by abusive plaintiffs and attorneys, and advance meritorious
actions brought by genuinely aggrieved shareholders); see also infra notes 157-64 and accom-
panying text (discussing American Law Institute's proposal addressing issue of demand and
demand futility).
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ment as a device to eliminate frivolous lawsuits." 7 Neither a standard based
on a breach of the duty of loyalty nor a standard based on the duty of
care, however, adequately ensures that a court will hear only legitimate
shareholder claims." ' To determine the worth of a shareholder's claim, a
court should look to the merits of the claim rather than focus on the
peripheral issue of compliance with the demand rule. 59 The American Law
Institute (ALI), for example, recently recommended a provision that requires
a court to examine the potential merit of a shareholder's claim and the
probable impact of the action on a corporation. 60 The ALI suggested that
157. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of demand
requirement).
158. See also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that directors
cannot evaluate objectively shareholder's claim under standard of demand futility based on
breach of duty of loyalty or duty of care); cf. Branson, supra note 29, at 412 (suggesting that
recent expansion of business judgment rule has made fiduciary duties amorphous). In evaluating
a shareholder's claim of demand futility, some courts rely on a standard based on the sound
discretion of the trial court. See Cathedral Estates v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 88 (2d
Cir. 1955) (relying on complaint and on findings of trial court in excusing demand); Abbe v.
Goss, 411 F. Supp. 923, 924-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (recognizing that no precise standard of
demand futility exists and consequently applying standard based on sound discretion of trial
court); Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (applying sound discretion
standard to excuse shareholder demand); see also 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.19 (2d
ed. 1975) (suggesting that district courts use sound discretion in determining whether demand
is futile because of lack of uniform judicial standard). One commentator has opined that the
sound discretion standard has created further confusion among courts attempting to establish
a standard of demand futility because sound discretion standard is not uniform. Note, The
Demand and Standing Requirements, supra note 2, at 170. A sound discretion standard allows
a court to disregard a rigid assessment of demand compliance and instead determine whether
prosecution of the shareholder's claim will benefit the corporation.
159. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978)
(stating that court should have limited power to review reasonableness of board's decision to
reject shareholder's action on behalf of corporation); see also ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORORATE
GOVERNANCE (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 1, § 7.03(b) comment, at 59-60 (stating that
demand requirement is complex but peripheral issue that court must resolve before proceeding
to merits of case); cf. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation:
A Critique of Zapata and the ALl Project, 1982 DuKE L.J. 959, 1008 (1982) (suggesting that
most effective method to remedy to structural bias is to require courts to use own independent
judgment in determining whether dismissal of shareholder's claim best benefits corporation).
160. Id. at § 7.08 comment, at 110. See generally Branson, supra note 29, at 414-28
(discussing American Law Institute's (ALI) new proposals to address issue of demand futility).
The ALI proposal resembles the approach to demand futility adopted in the Delaware courts.
See D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 12, at 279 (recognizing ALI rejection of
demand-required/demand-excused distinction and adoption of approach Delaware Supreme
court asserted in Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981)). Compare ALI PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 1, at §§ 7.08 & 7.10 with Zapata
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981). In Zapata, the Delaware Supreme Court
advocated a two-step test to determine demand futility. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788. First, the
Zapata court evaluated the independence and good faith of a special litigation committee's
decision to assume or refuse a shareholder's suit. Id. 430 A.2d at 788-89; see supra note 29
(special litigation committee is committee that board selects to determine merit of shareholder's
claim). If the committee decides that the shareholder's claim has no merit, the committee's
1987]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:955
special internal investigation procedures should apply to a situation in which
a shareholder sues directors, senior executives, controlling persons, or as-
sociates. 16 First, the ALI suggested that the board select an unbiased
committee to investigate the shareholder's claim. 62 The committee then
would decide whether the board should assume the shareholder's action on
behalf of the corporation, or the committee would suggest to a court that
the court dismiss the derivative action.163 According to the ALI, subsequent
judicial scrutiny will enhance the quality of committee review.' 64 Contrary
to the position of the Consumers Power court, therefore, the ALI approves
of limited judicial examination into the merits of the shareholder's case
sufficient to determine whether the case is frivolous or meritorious rather
than placing unnecessary emphasis on the shareholder's compliance with
the demand requirement.1
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In Matter of Consumers Power Company Derivative Litigation, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan recognized
the need to force shareholders to make demand on the directors prior to
commencing a derivative action. 66 The Consumers Power court devised a
standard of demand futility that requires a shareholder to allege that the
majority of the board of directors breached the duty of loyalty in authorizing
or supervising a transaction injurious tojhe corporation. 67 A standard
based on the breach of the duty of loyalty forces a shareholder to comply
with the demand requirement by ensuring that the shareholder will make
demand on the board of directors in almost every case. 61 In adopting a
strict standard of demand futility, the Consumers Power court followed the
decision goes before a court for judicial review. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788-89. If a court finds
that a corporation, through its board or special litigation committee, demonstrates independ-
ence, good faith, and reasonableness, the court then determines, in the exercise of its own
independent judgment, whether to dismiss the shareholder's claim. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789.
The Zapata court asserted that the two-step process constitutes a compromise between the
corporation's best interests and the shareholder's claims. Id. at 789.
161. ALI PnRIiNcnas oF CORPORATE GovNMACE (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra note 1, at
§ 7.08, at 106-08.
162. Id. § 7.10, at 148.
163. Id. § 7.08, at 106-08.
164. Id. § 7.08 comment, at 113.
165. Compare Matter of Consumers Power Company Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419,
424 (stating that judicial examination of merits of shareholder's claim is inappropriate at
demand stage) with ALI PRINciPLEs OF CORpoRATE GovRNANCE (Tent. Draft No. 6), supra
note 1, at § 7.08 comment, at 113 (suggesting that judicial examination of merits of share-
holder's claim, in event that board first refuses to assume claim, will ensure that court board
does not dismiss meritorious shareholder actions).
166. See Matter of Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 111 F.R.D. 419, 424 (E.D.
Mich. 1986) (discussing purpose and function of demand requirement).
167. See supra notes 56-150 and accompanying text (discussing Consumers Power court's
consideration of standards of demand futility used in other federal courts in developing
standard of demand futility).
168. See supra notes 120-46 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for asserting that
standard of demand futility based on breach of duty of loyalty promotes shareholder compliance
with Rule 23.1).
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majority view expressed in the First and Second Circuits, and rejected the
more liberal standard of demand futility based on a breach of the duty of
care adopted in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. 69 A strict standard of demand
futility encourages compliance with Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of
Procedure. 17
0
Although the Consumers Power court properly chose a standard of
demand futility based on a breach of the duty of loyalty rather than a
standard based on a breach of the duty of care, the Consumers Power
court overlooked the importance of determining whether the demand re-
quirement is the appropriate vehicle for evaluating the merit of a derivative
action.' 7' The Consumers Power court disregarded the potential for struc-
tural bias on a board, and failed to consider the ALI suggested approach
to demand of appointing a special committee to evaluate a shareholder's
claim. 72 Until the federal courts recognize that the demand requirement
does not operate effectively to eliminate frivolous suits and advance meri-
torious claims, the courts should require a shareholder to make demand on
the board of directors prior to commencing a derivative action.173 If a
shareholder reasonably suspects that making demand would be futile because
the directors could not consider the shareholder's claim impassionately and
objectively, then the shareholder should plead with particularity the share-
holder's reasons for declining to make demand. 7 4 The shareholders and the
directors should focus on the importance of the derivative suit as a tool
for asserting rights on behalf of the corporation. 75
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169. See supra notes 120-46 and accompanying text (discussing approaches various federal
courts employ to determine sufficiency of allegation of demand futility).
170. See supra notes 120-135 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of applying
strict standard of demand futility to encourage compliance with Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
171. See supra notes 151-65 and accompanying text (discussing Consumers Power court's
failure to consider whether demand requirement is appropriate vehicle for evaluating merit of
shareholder's claim).
172. See supra notes 151-65 and accompanying text (discussing Consumers Power court's
failure to recognize potential for structural bias, and failure to consider ALI approach to issue
of demand and demand futility). One commentator has criticized the ALI proposals because
the suggested special committee approach does not address the potential for structural bias.
Branson, supra note 29, at 415-16. Branson also attacked the proposals on the ground that
the special investigation procedures require the corporation to devote substantial time, energy
and funds to evaluating the merit of a shareholder's claim. See id. (ALI proposals require
excessive intracorporate consideration and treatment of every shareholder claim).
173. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that demand
requirement does not achiexe purpose of eliminating frivolous claims and advancing meritorious
claims).
174. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing derivative action as extraordinary
remedy requiring that shareholders make demand on directors in almost every case).
175. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing purpose and function of
derivative suit).
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